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Abstract 
Public perceptions of CCS are seen as crucial in terms of the deployment. Recent opposition to CO2 storage projects, such as 
Vattenfall’s Schwarze Pump project in northern Germany, demonstrates that addressing public concerns is a crucial factor in 
securing support for a CO2 scheme. Risk communication will be affected by multiple issues such as the language used, trust in 
the communicating actors and the opportunities for dialogue. The literature on siting of facilities also cautions that in many cases 
there in a mismatch between experts and lay perceptions of risk. This paper compares expert and lay perceptions of the risks 
associated with CCS in two case study areas and is based on the work undertaken in the CASSEM project, which is developing 
tools for the evaluation of CO2 storage potential in saline aquifer. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Introduction 
If CCS is to play a significant role in climate change mitigation, it must be deployed on a wide scale and the injected 
CO2 has to stay in the reservoir for hundreds if not thousands of years. The UK has a large offshore storage resource 
within depleted oil and gas fields and saline aquifers, with enough capacity to provide storage for other EU countries 
as well as the UK (DECC, 2010). Data and understanding of the reservoir characteristics built up over the lifetime of 
oil and gas extraction in UK waters means that the oil and gas storage sites are well understood, and there is a high 
level of confidence associated with the models used to simulate the process of geological storage. This contrasts 
with the high levels of uncertainty associated with the modelling of saline aquifers which are considerably less well 
understood. Furthermore, given that potential UK storage sites are offshore, data collection to evaluate a reservoir 
will be expensive. The CASSEM (CO2 Aquifer Storage Site Evaluation and Monitoring) project has adapted 
existing tools and techniques such that the suitability of an aquifer for CO2 storage may be assessed prior to 
committing financial resource to expensive drilling.  
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When a specific project is being considered, many factors will influence the selection of a reservoir, in a technical 
process in which a risk assessment process plays a key role. In the CASSEM methodology, a process of expert 
elicitation using Features, Events and Processes (FEP) technique, similar to that used in the nuclear industry, is used 
to identify the elements of the reservoir assessment which are associated with the greatest uncertainty; it is in these 
areas where data gathering is focused. This technique was applied to a saline aquifer in each of two case study areas, 
the Firth of Forth and Lincolnshire. Moving onto commercial deployment of CCS, once the process of developing a 
full commercial CCS project begins, risk assessment and communication is no longer the concern solely of experts 
but instead evaluation becomes a more social process, influenced by a range of key local influences.  To explore 
public perceptions of CCS, and its associated risks, a series of citizen panels were conducted in Dunfermline, on the 
Firth of Forth, and Pontefract, in Yorkshire and Humber.  Both these towns are close to coal fired power stations    
where CCS may be deployed in the future, and in the vicinity of the aquifers evaluated in the CASSEM project.  
This paper compares the expert and lay understandings of the risks associated with CCS identified by the CASSEM 
project. Section 2 discusses how the expert risk assessment was conducted; Section 3 describes the process of lay 
risk assessment.  Section 4 outlines the risks associated with storage of CO2 from the perspective of experts and 
Section 5 focuses on the lay assessment of risk. The two elements of the evaluation are brought together in Section 
6, the discussion and conclusions. 
2. Experts, CCS and risk  
From a technical risk assessment perspective, risk is a function of the likelihood and the severity of some adverse 
event. It is an essential part of the decision process for determining the suitability of a reservoir for storage. Risk 
assessment can be used to determine which of a number of potential storage sites are worthy of further evaluation, 
the types of studies it may be necessary to undertake to characterise a storage site, to identify potential risk 
mitigation activities, and ultimately to decide whether a reservoir should be used for CO2 storage. 
In the CASSEM project, a six step process has been developed for the compilation of a project-specific risk register 
which is applied to the two storage case studies; this is described in detailed in Polson, Curtis et al. (2009) [1] . The 
register contains a list of FEPs which define relevant scenarios and behaviour of CO2 in the storage reservoir; these 
are assessed by experts for their likelihood (L) of impacting the project, and the severity (S) of this impact. Each is 
assessed on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 is low and 5 high. The two scores are multiplied to give a combined score where a 
total score of 1 is considered negligible risk, a score of 2 to 4 is considered low risk, a score of 5 to 9 is considered 
moderate risk, a score of 10 to 16 is considered high risk and a score from 17 to 25 is considered very high risk. A 
FEP that scores in the high risk banding or above is regarded as prohibitively high for the project and mitigation 
activities should be implemented to reduce the risk to the moderate banding or below.  
Experts were assigned to assess FEP’s based on their expertise and were required to complete assessments at regular 
intervals throughout the project so that changes in their perception of risk, arising for example from new information 
concerning reservoir properties, could be tracked. The experts were asked to give ‘best-guess’ values for the 
likelihood and severity scores and also lower and upper bounds which could be used to assess the uncertainty in 
these scores. The process is designed to highlight the areas where risk is highest, with the intention that this 
information feeds into project decisions. The risk assessment results from the start of the project fed directly into 
project decisions, with a range of additional data acquisition activities identified which were in large part aimed at 
addressing areas perceived as high risk by the experts.     
3. Lay people, CCS and risk  
The risk assessment approach described in Section 2 typifies how decision makers seek information to predict and 
evaluate the consequences of various activities [2]. CCS deployment will ultimately take place within the social 
setting of towns, workplaces and wider society and there is a growing recognition that risk assessments can be 
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improved by incorporating a wider knowledge base into these ’technocratic’ approaches in relation to complex 
projects, with a high level of uncertainty [3]. The lay public, particularly those living in the vicinity of power station 
or new pipeline route will understandably have concerns over the deployment of a new and unfamiliar technology, 
and local knowledge of material importance to the development of a scheme, therefore a central function of 
contemporary risk assessment is to engage with the concerns held by members of the public. Contemporary ‘risk 
discourses’ have become dominated by the anticipation or perception of risk, consequently, the perceived risks of a 
new technologies are often a far greater threat, financially, politically and socially than the original physical threat 
[4].  
The research to explore public perceptions of the risks associated with CCS within the CASSEM case study areas 
was one element of a wider set of research questions focused on public perceptions of CCS and the factors which 
influence those perceptions explored in a series of citizen panels.  Citizen panel participants met for a total of 10 
hours, over the course of which experts from the CASSEM consortium presented information on CCS; they also 
received written briefing notes. The presentations focused on climate change and energy generation, CCS 
technology, CO2 storage and risks associated with CCS.  The CCS focused presentations were designed in response 
to specific requests for information gathered during the introductory session. Plentiful opportunities were provided 
for participants to discuss CCS with the experts, and small facilitated discussion groups ensured that everyone had 
the opportunity to be heard.  In addition the participants were asked to give feed back on the information they had 
been provided and comment on the citizen panel process. The citizen panel methodology is outlined in greater detail 
in the project report [5]. 
Although the risks associated with CCS were frequently mentioned by participants throughout the whole process, 
the specific risk assessment element of the citizen panels took place in the later stages, once the panel participants 
had received an overview of all aspects of CCS from the expert presentations, and had had the opportunity to discuss 
the technology with the experts.  A risk mapping exercise was performed in small facilitated groups where 
participants were asked to describe the risks they associated with CCS, and locate these within the CCS chain. The 
mapping exercise was followed by an expert presentation focusing initially on the expert risk assessment undertaken 
within the CASSEM project and then responding to the lay perceptions of risk as revealed by the mapping exercise. 
Following the risk presentation, participants were asked for their reactions to the risk presentation, and to highlight 
remaining areas of concern. 
4. Expert assessment of risk  
Figure 1 shows the best-guess scores for those FEP’s that were perceived as high risk (i.e. LxS  10) at the start of 
the project for either site. The scores for each site for both the start and the end of the project are shown. The risk 
assessment results at the start of the project showed that overall the highest perception of risk for both sites related to 
the financial viability of the project. Financial viability is not necessarily related directly to the properties of the 
storage sites but instead to the huge costs associated with any CCS project. The FEP’s ‘Construction of pipelines’, 
‘Construction and site logistics’ and ‘Public perception and security’ are also perceived as high risk and tend not to 
relate directly to the physical properties of the storage sites but instead are likely to reflect experts’ general concerns 
for any CCS project. 
However a number of the FEP’s do relate directly to the physical properties of the storage site and for these FEP’s it 
was possible to see a clear difference between the perceived risk for each site. In particular we see that for a range of 
FEP’s relating to the geological properties of the sites (‘Fractures and faults’, ‘Undetected features’, ‘Formation 
pressure’, ‘Lithology’ and ‘Heterogeneities’) are perceived as higher risk for the Firth of Forth site than the 
Yorkshire/Lincolnshire site [1]. This is related to the greater uncertainty in the geological properties of the Firth of 
Forth site which is far more complex structurally and has poorer quality and fewer data with which to constrain the 
geological model of the subsurface than the Yorkshire/Lincolnshire site.  
Other FEP’s relating to the properties of the storage site that are ranked as high risk relate to the hydrology of the 
region.  For both sites at the start of the project the FEP’s ‘Hydrogeology’ which relates to the hydrogeological 
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regime within the reservoir and the FEP’s ‘Near-surface aquifers and surface water bodies’ and ‘Near-surface 
Hydrogeological regime and water balance’ which relate to the hydrological properties of the near-surface 
environment are perceived as high risk [1]. Again this can be related to uncertainty with the experts unsure of the 
response to CO2 injection. In particular for the Yorkshire/Lincolnshire site there are concerns about the structure of 
the storage formation as is also shown in the FEP ‘Storage Concept’ which is also considered high risk. The 
Yorkshire/Lincolnshire formation is made up of a series of shallowly dipping layers which comes to outcrop far up-
dip from the injection site. Consequently there is not complete geometrical closure of the reservoir by the caprock 
and in the shallow near-surface, the aquifer contains fresh water. The perceived risks relating to the hydrogeology 
for this site relates primarily to the potential for contamination of this fresh water. 
Figure 1. The best-guess likelihood (L) x severity (S) scores for the star and end of the project for each site for those FEP’s that rank in the high 
risk or greater (10) at the start of the project for either site. 
These results were used to help select a range of data acquisition activities. These included reprocessing of seismic 
data for the Firth of Forth site with modern processing techniques to improve the quality of the data and a 
hydrogeological study of the region around the Yorkshire/Lincolnshire site. Comparing the experts’ risk scores at 
the end of the project we can assess whether these activities have changed the experts’ perception of risk. However 
as experts scores may change due to factors other than new information (for example cognitive biases) we need also 
to consult the experts to understand why they have changed their scores. By the end of the project the improved 
seismic data for the Firth of Forth had a noticeable impact on the ‘Fractures and faults’ FEP which decreased in 
response to fewer faults being interpreted in the re-processed data. The hydrology related FEP’s also saw their 
scores decrease for both sites. The results of the hydrological study showed that the interface between the fresh and 
salt water was unlikely to move as a result of injecting CO2. Therefore the experts’ perception of risk decreased for 
the Yorkshire/Lincolnshire site. This increased understanding also seems to have been transferred to the Firth of 
Forth site. 
Other noticeable changes include a decrease in the scores for the ‘Financial viability’ FEP. This change is a result of 
the alterations to the risk register with this FEP being divided into individual FEP’s which are assessed 
independently. The average of these is shown on Figure 1. The ‘Storage Concept’ FEP for the Firth of Forth site is 
seen as higher risk at the end of the project. This relates to a number of factors with the results of various work done 
within the project showing this site to be less suitable for CO2 storage than originally thought. The FEP 
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‘Pressurisation of reservoir on caprock’ also shows an increase in score however it remains in the same high risk 
band from the start to the end of the project. 
Overall the main factor affecting experts’ perception of risk is uncertainty with greater uncertainty tending to 
increase their perception of risk. The range (upper – lower bound) tends to be strongly correlated with the best-guess 
risk score (typical R value ~ 0.6, p-value < 0.001) showing that as the experts’ uncertainty increases, so does their 
perception of risk. Only through addressing this uncertainty will the experts’ perception of risk decrease, though it 
does not necessarily follow that less uncertainty will lead to a reduced perception of risk. 
5. Lay assessment of risk  
Whilst the citizen panel sessions focused in risk took place once participants had learnt about CCS, questions of risk 
unsurprisingly were raised throughout the whole panel.  When participants were initial introduced to the concept of 
CCS their early concerns focused on safety and particularly leakage, areas where they requested information to be 
provided during the experts presentations. The participants were keen to know whether the CO2 could leak and the 
consequences of a leak; would it be a danger to human health? Could CO2 explode? What happens if there is an 
earth quake? Will the CO2 remain stable for thousands of years? A number of people considered CO2 storage to pass 
the responsibility for climate change mitigation onto future generations and wanted to know whether CO2 was safer 
to store than nuclear waste. CO2 storage sites were perceived, by some, to be potential targets for a terrorist attack. A 
number of questions were raised about who decides the location of CO2 stores and how this is decided. Participants 
in the Dunfermline panel were concerned that there was a danger that rich countries could end up dumping CO2 in 
unsafe and poorly regulated storage sites in the developing world. 
Maps of the CCS chain which detail the risks associated with CCS from a lay perspective are contained within the 
project report [5]. Table 1 summarises the lay risks for each of the case study areas and indicates where on the CCS 
chain the risk is judged to occur 
Table 1 Lay assessment of the risks associated with CCS 
Dunfermline Pontefract 
Human health and 
safety 
 Risks from the chemicals used in CCS 
process (C) 
 Explosions (C) 
 Potential target for terrorism  
 Health and safety of staff (C)  
 Accident in the chemical process (C) 
 Explosions in compression (C) 
 Potential target for terrorism (C) 
 Safety of workforce (C, T, S) 
 What happens to the CO2 if the 
technology fails? (C) 
Environmental 
impact/damage 
 What is the effect of CO2 storage on the 
marine ecology? (S) 
 Pipeline leak (T) 
 Impact on food chain from leaks (T and S) 
 Leak effects on sea acidity (T and S) 
 What is the effect of CO2 storage on the 
marine ecology? (T and S) 
 Concern about the effect on rocks, life, 
bacteria in the long term (S) 
 Water displacement (S) 
 How secure will it be in the long term? 
Plates moving (S) 
 Will there be sea level rise from CO2
pushing the cap or filling the space? (S) 
 Environmental impacts of building 
pipelines – land/sea (T) 
 Impact on marine life (T) 
 Leakage from pipeline (T) 
 Large-scale environmental damage 
(S) 
 Impact of leakage on the 
surrounding area (C)  
 Leakage from cap-rock (S) 
 Seismic activity (S) 
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Dunfermline Pontefract 
Financial, 
regulation/governance 
 How prepared is the Government for 
leaks? Is there a contingency plan? 
 Cost of monitoring 
 Who takes responsibility for cross-
border issues? 
 What are the financial risks? 
 Will Scotland benefit financially or 
will the money go to the UK 
Government in London? 
 Companies trying to save money by 
implementing the technology on the 
cheap (C) 
 Risk from private companies – money 
– regulatory failure (C, T, S) 
 Taking away investment from 
renewables  
 Political risk - territory 
CCS concept  Impact of the capture process on the 
efficiency of the power station  (C) 
 Drilling (S) 
 Contamination of oil fields (S) 
 Long term behaviour of CO2 (S) 
 Uncertainty of new system – no proof 
it will actually work (C, T, S) 
(C) risk associated with the capture of CO2; (T) risk associated with the transport of CO2; (S) risk associated with the storage of CO2
Members of the CASSEM consortium with expertise in risk, CO2 storage and capture and transport engineering 
attended the citizen panels to provide information on CCS to the participants and to discuss their concerns with 
them.  Following the risk presentation, participants were able to respond to the information they had received; Table 
2 outlines the remaining concerns. 
Table 2 Lay assessment of risk associated with CCS at the end of the citizen panel process 
Combined results from both panels 
Human health and safety  
Environmental 
impact/damage 
 There will always be a potential for leakage 
 Damage to the marine ecology from leaks  
Financial, 
regulation/governance 
 The final costs are not known and could be very high; these will impact on the 
price of electricity 
 Investment will be taken away from renewable energy
 How can monitoring be assured over 1000’s of years?
 Are international governance structures adequate to ensure cross-border 
regulation?  
CCS concept  Risk to climate change mitigation from relying on an uncommercialised 
technology 
 Risks arising from the continued use of coal 
 CO2 storage network, what risk to the UK from storing other country’s CO2? 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
In this paper, we describe two assessments of the risks associated with CCS, one from an expert perspective, and the 
other from a lay perspective. The results of the expert assessment were presented to the participants at a series of 
citizen panels focusing on CCS, at which experts who had contributed to the expert assessment were able to discuss 
risk with the panel participants.  
Taking the expert assessment as a starting point, there was a strong relationship between the risk associated with an 
aspect of CO2 storage, and uncertainty. Thus, a higher level of risk was associated with those elements of the risk 
register which were the most uncertain.  In project terms, this was a useful means of guiding data acquisition; 
reprocessing of seismic data took place for the Firth of Forth site and hydrogeological assessments were performed 
for the Lincolnshire aquifer.  A decrease in the risk associated with these elements is clear by the end of the project 
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which the experts attribute to the new knowledge.  Interestingly the impact of public perceptions on a project also 
emerges as a significant risk from the expert assessment, with little change in the associated risk between the 
beginning and end of the project. 
There were some risks associated with CCS that were perceived as important by both experts and the lay public. In 
both the lay and expert assessment, financial risks were ranked most highly, though unsurprisingly focused on 
different aspects:  the expert assessment was over the viability of the industry, whereas for the lay public it was a 
concern over who would pay and the impact of CCS upon their energy bills. The potential for leakage also emerged 
as a high risk from both assessments, though with differing levels of detail.  The technical assessment of the experts 
was multi-dimensional, considering the risk of leakage from a variety of different pathways e.g. fractures, faults and 
pressurisation of the cap rock. In contrast, the lay assessment of leakage did not unpack leakage in the same manner, 
for reasons of lack of technical knowledge.  The influence of uncertainty was also evident on the lay assessment of 
risk, with participants pushing the experts to be explicit about the uncertainty associated with their assessments.  
Ultimately uncertainty was accepted and risks judged to be acceptable as a consequence of the trust built between 
experts and participants, a point which is returned to later. Given that CCS is a new technology, and few people as 
yet have direct experience of living with a CCS neighbour, our participants did not have their own experiences of 
risks with which to counter the expert assessment.  This may explain, in part, the similarity between the lay and 
expert assessments, as well as the good relationships that developed between experts and participants.
Moving on to consider the lay risk perceptions in more detail, these clearly evolved and became more sophisticated 
over the course of the citizen panels. Giddens (1999) [6] describes how ‘society is becoming more pre-occupied 
with the future (and safety)’ which provides an insight into the initial focus of panel participants on the risks 
associated with CCS.  As people learnt more about the technology, and were able to enter into discussions both with 
each other and with experts, their understanding of the risks associated with CCS evolved and became more subtle.  
Whilst there were clearly risks which were of concern to local people which did not appear on the risk register e.g. 
sea level rise because of bubbles of stored CO2 pushing up the rock beneath the sea bed, others such as security, site 
logistics and pipeline construction were of concern to experts and the lay public alike. Although the number of areas 
of concern increased during the panel process, by the end of the process, fewer outstanding concerns remained. Thus 
whilst the potential for environmental damage and leakage remained of concern, the areas of greatest risk were 
associated with regulation, governance, finance and the basic CCS concept.  
The citizen panels were designed as a highly deliberative process, with ample opportunity for discussions between 
experts and participants who, at the beginning of the process knew nothing about CCS, and little about climate 
change.  CCS is a highly technical and complex process of which people, as yet, have little experience.  The panel 
participants did not make technical judgments themselves, but instead made decisions about the risks associated 
with the technology based on their interactions with the experts and the information they provided. These decisions 
are guided by social trust, where social trust refers to the processes people use to reduce the complexities 
surrounding the formation of a perspective on new technology or other potentially risky innovation [7]. When 
people do not have the technical knowledge to evaluate a risk themselves, they base their judgment on their 
evaluation of those managing the risk or hazard.  As the participants built a relationship with the experts, who were 
happy to discuss all aspects of CCS and answer questions, they decided they trusted them and were willing to accept 
the information provided. This resulted partly in less uncertainty in the minds of participants, but also in the 
acceptance of uncertainty. Thus, many of the concerns over CO2 storage, capture and transport were addressed 
through discussions with the experts.  For those areas, particularly regulation and governance for which no experts 
were present, concern remained. It is however useful to note that a distrust of government was highlighted in 
questionnaire responses.   
In some ways the process of expert elucidation of risk was comforting to the citizen panel participants, as it 
demonstrated a logical and structured way of thinking about CCS and the risks of storage, and for the siting of 
reservoirs. On the other hand it raised concerns over who makes the final decision about whether a particular 
reservoir should be used and the need for trust in the organisation making the final decision. Deliberative processes 
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as demonstrated in the CASSEM citizen panels are a useful approach to facilitate discussions between those 
deploying CCS and affected communities.  
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